Nebraska Law Review
Volume 77 | Issue 3

Article 5

1998

Requiring Managed Care to Disclose the Use of
Financial Incentives: Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625
(8th Cir. 1997)
Paul Heimann
University of Nebraska College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
Recommended Citation
Paul Heimann, Requiring Managed Care to Disclose the Use of Financial Incentives: Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997), 77 Neb.
L. Rev. (1998)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol77/iss3/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

Note*

Requiring Managed Care to Disclose
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INTRODUCTION

The American health care system is in the midst of a transformation from a traditional fee-for-service system to a managed care system.1 Under the traditional fee-for-service system, physicians were
insulated from the cost of care they administered to their patients because the patient's insurer simply paid the bill that the physician submitted to them. 2 Due to the rising costs of health care, however,
policymakers and employers created managed care 3 as an alternative
©Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
1. See John K. Iglehart, Physiciansand the Growth ofManaged Care, 331 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1167, 1167-68 (1994)(1993 study shows 51% of people with employer
sponsored health care are enrolled in managed care).
2. See Mark A. Hall, A Theory of Economic Informed Consent, 31 GA. L. REv. 511,
513 (1997).
3. Managed care is a generic term used to refer to any system used to contain health
care costs by eliminating unneeded medical care. Specifically, managed care or-
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to the traditional fee-for-service arrangement. Unlike the traditional
fee-for-service system, managed care organizations (MCOs) both deliver and finance health care for their enrollees. Enrollees pay premiums, and in return, are entitled to receive a complete menu of medical
services from the physicians in the MCO. Because the premiums are
fixed, an MCO's ability to turn a profit is dependent on its ability to
reduce the amount of care that it administers under its plan.
MCO's put much of the burden of reducing unneeded, expensive
care on the physicians under their plan through the use of financial
incentives. Primary care physicians serve as "gatekeepers" who decide whether a patient requires expensive care, such as referral to specialists, laboratory tests, or in-patient hospital stays. Most financial
incentives discourage the use of expensive treatment by holding the
physicians financially responsible for expensive care. 4 Such arrangements sharply contrast traditional fee-for-service arrangements,
where it is in the physician's financial best interests to provide more
care because they will be compensated by the insurer for whatever
care they administer.
The main criticism of financial incentive arrangements is that they
create a conflict of interest between the physician's duty to provide
treatment to his/her patient and the physician's financial well-being.5
ganizations use pre-admission certification, concurrent review, discharge planning, and case- management techniques to reduce the costs of care. Managed
Care Organizations (MCOs) have many forms, such as the Health Maintenance
Organization (HMO), Preferred Provider Organization (PPO), Physician Hospital
Organization (PHO), and Integrated Delivery Systems (IDS). The central goal of
eliminating unneeded care is the same for each of these organizations, regardless
of their form. See Brian P. Battaglia, The Shift Toward Managed Care and
Emerging Liability ClaimsArising From UtilizationManagement and Financial
Incentive Arrangements Between Health Care Providers and Payers, 19 U. ARK.
LrrrL= RoCm L.J. 155, 155-56 (1997).
4. Usually, such incentives are in the form of capitation or bonus/withhold compensation arrangements. In the typical capitation arrangement, a physician receives
an actuarially determined amount per patient which takes into account the risk
factors in the physician's patient pool. If the physician's costs exceed the capitated amount, the costs of care will come out of the physician's own pocket. Theoretically, the capitated amount reflects the physician's patient pool, so that if any
one patient's costs exceed the capitated amount, such costs would be offset by
patients whose care does not exceed the capitated amount.
In the bonus/withhold compensation arrangement, a certain percentage of the
doctor's salary is withheld. The withheld amount is then used by the MCO as a
bonus for physicians under the plan who control referrals to specialists, hospital
stays, or other costly care. The less expensive services that a physician provides
to his/her patients, the more bonus money the physician receives. See Michelle
M. Kwon, Move Over Marcus Welby, M.D. and Make Way ForManaged Care: The
Implications of Capitation, Gag Clauses, and Economic Credentialing,28 TEx.
TECH L. Rav. 829, 838-39 (1997).
5. See Deven C. McGraw, FinancialIncentives to Limit Services: Should Physicians
be Required to Disclose these to Patients?, 83 GEO. L.J. 1821, 1824 (1995).
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However, because there is a clear legislative intent to allow the use of
such incentives to reduce the costs of care, courts have, for the most
part, been unwilling to consider claims that attack financial incentives. 6 In addition, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA)7 acts as a shield that insulates MCOs from claims for
compensatory and punitive damages in state courts.8
Claims against MCOs for harm that results from their use of financial incentives face an especially hostile judicial and legislative environment. The Eighth Circuit decision in Shea v. Esensten,9 illustrates
just how hostile the environment is. In Shea, a widow brought an action in state court for the wrongful death of her husband. She alleged
that her husband's Health Maintenance Organization was fraudulent
in its nondisclosure and misrepresentation about its physician incentive programs, and this limited her husband's ability to make an informed choice about life-saving health care.10 In its decision, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that ERISA preempted Mrs.
Shea's state law claim, and that the Health Maintenance Organization had a fiduciary duty under ERISA to disclose its financial incentive structure. The court, however, failed to address the fact that
under ERISA Mrs. Shea would not be able to receive punitive or compensatory damages for the death of her husband.
The holding in Shea that MCOs have a fiduciary duty to disclose
their use of physician incentives under ERISA does not overcome the
judicial reluctance to consider claims which attack physician incentives. Shea instead held that there is a fiduciary duty to disclose such
incentives. The court appeared only to address the hidden nature of
such incentives and did not discuss the conflict such incentives create
between the physician's duty to care for his/her patient and the physician's own financial interests. Therefore, plaintiffs who allege that
physician incentives are the cause of injuries or malpractice will continue to face a judicial environment that is hostile to their claims.
In addition, the holding in Shea maintains an ERISA preemption
structure which continues to insulate MCOs from compensatory and
punitive damages."i Under ERISA, plaintiffs who allege that their
MCO's financial incentive arrangements caused their injury will only
be able to collect equitable damages. The court failed to address that
under ERISA, a plaintiff like Mrs. Shea will not be able to collect any
damages for the breach of the fiduciary duty to disclose financial incentive arrangements to reduce care.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

See id. at 1833.
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
See discussion infra Part III.B.
107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 297 (1997).
See id. at 627.
See id.
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This Note first presents the factual background and procedural
history of Shea. Next, this Note analyzes the judicial and legislative
reluctance to hold MCOs accountable for the results of their use of
financial incentives. This Note then examines: 1) the impact of ERISA preemption on cases like Shea that attack the use of financial incentives to reduce care; 2) the court's solution to the "problem"
presented in Shea, holding that there is a fiduciary duty to disclose
such incentives under ERISA; and 3) the fact that despite the court's
holding, Mrs. Shea cannot receive compensatory damages for the
death of her husband. This Note concludes by finding that despite the
court's interest in protecting patients from the "hidden nature" of financial incentives, the holding does little to address the larger
problems which are implicit in such arrangements.
II. BACKGROUND
2

Shea v. Esensten1 began as a wrongful death action in Minnesota
state court. The plaintiffs husband was an employee of Seagate Technologies, Inc. Seagate provided health care benefits to its employees
by contracting with a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO)
known as Medica. Medica required Seagate employees to select a primary care physician from its preferred provider list. Mr. Shea selected his family doctor, who happened to be on the list.13
After being hospitalized with severe chest pains during an overseas business trip, Mr. Shea visited his family doctor. During these
visits, Mr. Shea informed his physician that he was suffering from
chest pains, shortness of breath, muscle tingling, and dizziness. Mr.
Shea, who was forty years old at the time, also revealed that his family had an extensive history of heart disease.14 Despite all the warning signs, Mr. Shea's doctor insisted that a referral to a cardiologist
was unnecessary. When his condition did not improve, Mr. Shea offered to pay for the cost of the specialist out of his own pocket. Mr.
Shea's doctor, however, persuaded him that he was too young and did
not have enough symptoms to justify a visit to a cardiologist. A few
months later, Mr. Shea died of heart failure.15
Unknown to Mr. Shea, Medica provided financial incentives to its
physicians to not refer their patients to specialists. Specifically, physicians under the plan were docked a portion of their pay if they referred too many of their patients to specialists, and were rewarded
bonus pay for making fewer referrals.16 In Mrs. Shea's wrongful
death action against Medica, she alleged that if her husband had
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

107
See
See
See
See

F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 297 (1997).
id. at 627.
id. at 626.
id.
id. at 627.
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known that his physician had a financial incentive not to refer him to
a specialist, he would have disregarded his physician's advice, and he
would have sought the opinion of a cardiologist at his own expense.' 7
Medica removed Mrs. Shea's claim to federal court, contending
that Mrs. Shea's claims were preempted by ERISA.18 After her motion to remand was denied, Mrs. Shea amended her complaint to allege that Medica's "behind-the-scenes" efforts to use financial
incentives to reduce referrals to specialists violated Medica's fiduciary
duties under ERISA.19 The district court dismissed Mrs. Shea's
amended complaint for failure to state a claim, finding that the HMO
was not required to disclose its physician compensation arrangements
because such arrangements are not "material facts affecting the beneficiary's interests."20
The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of Mrs.
Shea's case. The court found that: 1) the district court correctly held
Mrs. Shea's original state law claim was preempted by ERISA; 2)
under ERISA, there is an affirmative duty to disclose material information "which could adversely affect a plan member's interests;" 21
and 3) financial incentives to reduce care are indeed material facts
which required disclosure under ERISA's fiduciary provisions.22
The court's finding that Mrs. Shea's state law claims were preempted by ERISA was clearly in keeping with past case law. 23 Such
claims are preempted by ERISA because the outcome of such a case
would clearly affect how the health plan would be administered.2 4
The preemption of Mrs. Shea's state law claims was in line with Congress's intent to ensure the "nationally uniform administration of employee benefit plans."25
The finding that there is an "affirmative" duty to disclose material
information, however, represents an extension of an ERISA-qualified
plan administrator's fiduciary duties. While the court cited several
cases that strongly suggest that there is such a duty,2 6 none of the
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See id.
See id. at 627.
See id. at 627 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(21), 1104(a)(1)).
Id. at 627.
Id. at 628.
See id.
See discussion infra Part III.B.
See Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 627 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
297 (1997).
25. Id. (citing New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995)).
26. Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 628-29 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
297 (1997)(citing Howe v. Varity Corporation, 36 F.3d 746, 754 (8th Cir. 1994));
Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co. of America, 919 F.2d 747, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1990);
Bixler v. Central Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1300 (3d
Cir. 1993)).
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decisions clearly held there is an "affirmative" duty to disclose under
ERISA. Indeed, while these cases hold that a fiduciary under ERISA
has a duty not to "lie to" or mislead its beneficiaries, the question of
whether there is an "affirmative" duty to disclose remained unanswered.27 However, the tendency of the courts to rely on the common
law of trusts indicates that ERISA fiduciaries do indeed have a fiduci28
ary duty to disclose material information.
Most significantly, the court's holding that financial incentives to
physicians which discourage referrals to specialists are "material facts
requiring disclosure," represents the first decision that has expressed
genuine concern that such arrangements may compromise patients'
interests. 2 9 Most previous decisions that attack financial incentive arrangements were dismissed because of the clear legislative intent al30
lowing such arrangements to reduce the cost of health care.
However, Shea does not hold that such arrangements are in and of
themselves illegal, and thus, does not directly conflict with legislative
intent. Instead, the court addressed its concerns with the hidden nature of physician incentives by declaring that there is a fiduciary duty
to disclose such incentives so that patients can decide whether or not
to trust their physician's judgment. 3 1 A claim alleging that there is a
fiduciary duty to disclose represents a new approach to the concerns
surrounding the use of financial incentives which reduce care.
III.

ANALYSIS OF SHEA V. ESENSTEN

In Shea, the Eighth Circuit attempted to address the hidden nature of financial incentives. Yet, requiring disclosure does not appear
to overcome the most significant problem that such arrangements create: financial incentives put physicians in the precarious position of
having to choose between their patients' well-being and their own financial well-being.
A.

Managed Care Organizations Traditionally Have Not
Been Held Accountable for Cost-Containment
Mechanisms

MCOs attempt to control the cost of health care by creating financial incentives, such as salary bonus or holdback systems, to reduce
27. In Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996), the Court determined that a fiduciary has a duty not to mislead plan members, but noted that because the defendant's actions were intentional, it did not have to decide the issue of whether a
fiduciary is under the obligation to affirmatively disclose material facts.
28. See id. at 496-97, 502-03.
29. See id.
30. See discussion infra Part lI.
31. See Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 629 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
297 (1997).
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patients' utilization of expensive health care services, such as hospitalization, referral to specialists, and diagnostic testing.3 2 However,
along with the reduced costs of care that result from such incentives
comes the fear that incentives will interfere with the provider-patient
relationship and corrupt the medical judgment of the provider, ultimately damaging his/her patient's interests. In Shea, these fears
were realized when the plaintiffs husband died shortly after his physician refused to refer him to a specialist.
The Eighth Circuit was addressing such concerns when it held that
MCOs have a fiduciary duty to disclose such incentives. Although no
court before Shea had examined whether financial incentives used by
MCOs must be disclosed, an examination of the case law indicates
that courts have generally refused to find MCOs liable for financial
incentives that cause physicians to under-treat their patients. This is
because such holdings would be in direct conflict with the legislative
33
intent to allow MCOs to reduce the costs of health care.
The California cases of Wickline v. California34 and Wilson v. Blue
Cross 35 were potential precedent setting decisions for finding MCOs
liable for cost containment mechanisms that interfere with a physician's medical judgment. In Wickline, the plaintiff alleged that MediCal, California's Medicaid HMO system, implemented a faulty utilization review procedure that caused her to be discharged four days earlier than was recommended by her physician.36 She alleged that this
delay led to the amputation of her leg. 37 The court found that neither
the plaintiffs treating physician nor Medi-Cal fell below the legally
applicable standard of care. 38 However, the court did state that
"[t]hird party payors of health care services can be held legally accountable when medically inappropriate decisions result from defects
in the design or implementation of cost containment mechanisms ...."39 Nonetheless, the court noted that the physician "cannot
point to the health care payor as the liability scapegoat when the consequences of his own determinative medical decisions go sour."4 0
In Wilson, the court sought to clarify the meaning of the dicta in
Wickline. In Wilson, the plaintiffs alleged that their son's suicide was
a result of the defendant's utilization review procedures which were
followed when their son was released from a psychiatric ward, despite
32. See supra note 4.
33. See Barry R. Furrow, Managed Care Organizationsand PatientInjury: Rethinking Liability, 31 GA. L. REv. 419, 465-73 (1997).
34. 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Ct. App. 1986).
35. 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Ct. App. 1990).
36. See Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 811 (Ct. App. 1986).
37. See id.
38. See id. at 819-20.
39. Id. at 819.
40. Id.
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the treating physician's opinion that the release was premature. 41 In
denying the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court
stated the defendant could be found liable if its utilization review
techniques were a substantial factor in the harm caused to the plaintiffs.42 As applied to the facts in Shea, the defendant would be found
liable if Medica's financial incentives to not refer the plaintiffs husband to a specialist was a substantial factor in his death.
The holdings in Wickline and Wilson set a precedent for examining
MCOs' utilization review policies. This precedent could have been
used to examine the financial incentives that were used in Shea because both utilization review and financial incentives to reduce care
are similar in their role as cost-containment mechanisms.4 3 Yet despite the guidance of Wickline and Wilson, there are few reported
cases involving allegations that financial incentives have led to a patient's injury.4 The only successful case which seems to follow the
precedent is the unreported case of Bush v. Dake.45 In Bush, the
plaintiff alleged that the financial incentives 4 6 used by the HMO deterred her physician from giving her a timely pap smear, which in
turn delayed the detection of her cervical cancer.4 7 The plaintiff contended the HMO's policies provided physicians with financial disincentives to properly treat, refer, and hospitalize patients. 48 The court
found that there was "a genuine issue of material fact presented as to
whether [the HMO] in and of itself proximately contributed to the
malpractice."4 9 This holding indicates that courts are willing to examine whether the design of specific financial incentives themselves
result in liability, but not whether all financial incentives should re41. See Wilson v. Blue Cross, 271 Cal. Rptr. 876, 881-882 (Ct. App. 1990).
42. Specifically the court held that the test for joint liability for tortious conduct
provides:
The actors' negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if(a) his
conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and, (b) there
is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability because of the manner
in which his negligence has resulted in the harm.
Id. at 883 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965)).
43. See Andrew Ruskin, Capitation: The Legal Implications of Using Capitationto
Affect Physician Decision Making Processes, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoL'y
391, 403 (1997).
44. See id.
45. No. 86-25767 (Saginaw County, Mich. Apr. 27, 1989), reprintedin BARRY R. FuRROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 719-22 (2d ed. 1991).

46. The HlMO would set aside a certain amount of money each year for the network
physicians. The money would be depleted with each referral to a specialist or the
hospitalization of a patient made during the year. At the end of the year, the
remaining money would be divided among the HMO and the network physicians.
See id. at 720.
47. See id. at 720-21.
48. See id. at 721.
49. Id.
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sult in liability. The case was settled on appeal, and it has no precedential value since it is unpublished.
Courts have generally refused to follow the precedent established
in Wickline and Wilson by considering financial incentives as causative agents of adverse medical outcomes. 50 Legislative policy assumes
that such arrangements are a valuable approach for controlling health
care costs.51 The original HMO statute actually encourages the use of
financial incentives to reduce costs. 5 2 Because they are a central part
of managed care and legislatures approve of such efforts to reduce
costs, courts have consistently refused to question the validity of such
incentives. 53 Instead, courts only examine whether or not the proper
standard of care was met with respect to a particular patient, and regard the fact that the treating physician could receive a financial ben54
efit as irrelevant.
This conclusion is clearly illustrated in Pulvers v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan.55 In Pulvers, a plan member sued the plan and a
participating physician for failure to refer a patient for a biopsy, which
the patient alleged would have led to a timely diagnosis of a condition
50. Recently, however, the court in Hendrich v. Pegraim, 154 F.2d 362 (7th Cir.
1998), held on a motion for summary judgment "that [physician] incentives can
rise to the level of a breach [of fiduciary duty under ERISA] where, as pleaded
here, the fiduciary trust between plan participants and plan fiduciaries no longer
exists (i.e. where physicians delay administering proper care to plan beneficiaries
for the sole purpose of increasing their bonuses)." Id. at 373.
51. See Furrow, supra note 33, at 467 & n.206 (noting that Medicare and Medicaid
beneficiaries are allowed to enroll in HMOs at public expense); see also McClellan
v. Health Maintenance Org., 604 A.2d 1053, 1057 n.6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)("The
fundamental prerogative and duty of considering and establishing social policy,
including, of course, the regulation of health care providers, is vested solely in the
legislature."); Rex O'Neal, Note, Safe Harborfor Health Care Cost Containment,
43 STAN. L. REv. 399, 400-401 (1991)(noting that no court has found an insurer
liable for its efforts to reduce costs because implementing cost containment mechanisms is in "society's economic interests").
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 300e (1994). The HMO statute provides that HMOs shall "assume full financial risk on a prospective basis for the provision of basic health
services, except that [an HMO] may... make arrangements with physicians or
other health professionals, health care institutions, or any combination of such
individuals or institutions to assume all or part of the financial risk on a prospective basis for the provision of basic health services by the physicians or other
health professionals through the institutions." 42 U.S.C. § 300e(c)(2)(D) (1994).
53. See Pulvers v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 160 Cal. Rptr. 392 (Ct. App. 1979).
54. See Madsen v. Park Nicollet Med. Center, 419 N.W.2d 511, 515 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988)(excluding evidence of financial incentives in a medical malpractice action
against an HMO because such evidence would be "only marginally relevant, and
potentially very prejudicial"), rev'd on other grounds, 431 N.W.2d 855 (Minn.
1988); Sweede v. Cigna Healthplan, No. Civ.A.87C-SE-171-1-CV, 1989 WL
12608, AT *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 2, 1989)(holding that any connection between
the HMO financial arrangement and the non-referral decision was too remote to
be of any probative value).
55. 160 Cal. Rptr. 392 (Ct. App. 1979).
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known as Bowen's disease. The plaintiff alleged that the financial incentives in the plan, which compensated physicians for providing less
care, led the plaintiff and his wife to fraudulently believe that they
would receive the "best quality" of care and treatment. The court
squarely rejected the plaintiffs arguments because the Health Maintenance Act of 1973 specifically requires the use of incentive plans as a
means to control health care costs. 5 6 The court noted that even
though the plan encouraged its members to reduce costs through the
individual
use of financial incentives, such incentives do not prevent
57
physicians from meeting the required standard of care.
Thus, plaintiffs like Mrs. Shea, who find themselves harmed by the
use of financial incentives, face a judiciary that has been unwilling to
allow any claims that would interfere with the use of financial incentives to lower the cost of health care. However, in Shea, Mrs. Shea did
not allege the use of the financial incentives was the cause of her husband's death. Rather, she alleged the nondisclosure of the financial
incentives caused her husband's death. Mrs. Shea's attack on
Medica's physician incentives represented an issue that had not been
addressed by the courts. Namely, whether financial incentives,
although legal, must nonetheless be disclosed to the beneficiaries of
managed care plans. Unlike claims that allege the use of financial incentives caused the plaintiffs harm, claims which allege nondisclosure
arguably do not directly contradict the legislative intent to allow incentives which reduce the cost of health care.
B.

The Role of ERISA in Claims that Attack Physician
Incentives in Managed Care

In Shea, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district
court's finding that Mrs. Shea's state law wrongful death action was
preempted by ERISA.58 The preemption of Mrs. Shea's claim results
in a recovery that is limited to the remedies available under ERISA.
Therefore, ERISA creates additional hurdles for plaintiffs like Mrs.
Shea who bring claims against MCOs because recovery is limited to
equitable damages.
Congress enacted ERISA to protect participants in employee benefit plans, including employee health plans administered by MCOs, by
imposing regulatory control on employee benefit programs. 59 Specifically, ERISA seeks to protect employees by requiring reporting and
disclosure of plan provisions, and establishing standards for minimum
56. See id. at 394.
57. See id.
58. See Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 627 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
297 (1997).
59. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
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vesting, financial responsibility, and fiduciary duties.60 In addition,
ERISA's enforcement provisions 6 1 and sweeping preemption
clauses, 6 2 serve to "eliminat[e] the threat of conflicting or inconsistent
state and local regulation of employee benefit plans."6 3 This result is
squarely in line with the congressional intent to create a national uniform system for the administration of employee benefits. 6 4 Because
up to seventy-five percent of all managed care plans are ERISA qualified, ERISA will continue to play a major role in litigation involving
MCOs.65
ERISA's civil enforcement provisions and preemption provisions
have the combined effect of cutting off remedies for patients who are
injured as a result of an MCO's cost-containment mechanisms. This is
because courts have consistently held that ERISA displaces direct tort
claims against MCOs that administer ERISA qualified health plans.66
Once MCOs remove such claims to federal court, recovery is limited to
67
equitable damages.
ERISA preemption is particularly important to MCOs because it
limits damages to those which are allowed under ERISA's civil enforcement provisions. Damages under ERISA are limited to the recovery of benefits, the enforcement of rights, or the clarifications of future
60. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (1994) (detailing the reporting and disclosure requirements); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061 (1994)(providing the minimum vesting standards); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1082-1086 (1994)(providing the minimum funding
standards); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114 (1994)(assigning fiduciary responsibility).
61. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1994) (civil enforcement provision of ERISA). Under ERISA'S civil enforcement provision, an employee benefit plan participant or beneficiary can bring a civil action in federal or state court to "recover benefits due to
him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan,
or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan." Id.
§ 1132(a)(1)(b).
62. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994) (the express preemption clause of ERISA). The
preemption clause provides that ERISA's provisions "shall supersede any and all
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan." Id.
63. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46 (1987) (quoting 120 CONG. REc.
29,933 (1974)); see also New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield
Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 646 (1995)(noting that "[tihe basic
thrust of the [ERISA] preemption clause was to avoid a multiplicity of state regulation in order to permit the national uniform administration of employee benefit
plans").
64. See New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 646 (1995).
65. See Furrow, supra note 33, at 494.
66. See Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan, Inc., 999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1993); Corcoran v. United Health Care Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992)(holding that ERISA
preempts actions based on wrongful denial of benefits even though no adequate
remedy could be provided).
67. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a) (1994)(expressly limiting recovery under ERISA to equitable remedies).
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benefits under the plan. 68 Claims that seek punitive or compensatory
damages are not available under ERISA's civil enforcement provisions.69 Plaintiffs whose claims are preempted by ERISA will find
that damages normally available in state court will not be available
under ERISA. Preemption allows ERISA-qualified MCOs to enact
stringent cost-containment mechanisms, such as utilization review
and financial incentives, with little exposure to compensatory or puni70
tive damages for the results of such incentives.
In light of this structure, most MCOs will fall within the protection
of ERISA unless they take no part in the administration of the plan.
Typically, like the defendant in Shea, it is the MCO that administers
the employee health benefit plan through benefit determinations and
cost-containment mechanisms. To the extent that claims against such
an MCO "relate to" the administration of the employee benefit plan,
the managed care plan will be insulated from compensatory and punitive damage claims. 7 1 It is in the employer's and the MCO's best interests to allow the MCO to administer benefits under the employee
health plan. The MCO can reduce its costs by insulating itself from
compensatory and punitive damages, which in turn, may lower the
employer's costs in providing health care to its employees.
Three ERISA sections deal specifically with preemption. The express preemption clause dictates that any state law is preempted if it
relates to any employee benefit plan.7 2 The "savings clause" 73 excludes from preemption state laws regulating insurance and banking,
while the "deemer clause" 74 provides that an employee benefit plan
68. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a)(1)(B) (1994); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (1994)(stating that
a fiduciary under ERISA "shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial
relief as the court may deem appropriate").
69. Courts have consistently held that compensatory damages are not available as
appropriate equitable relief under ERISA's civil enforcement provision. See McLeod v. Oregon Lithoprint Inc., 102 F.3d 376, 378 n.2 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 1823 (1997)(noting that "[a]ll of the circuits which have considered the
issue [of whether compensatory damages are available under ERISA] have held
that compensatory damages are not available as 'appropriate equitable relief
under [ERISA]"); see also Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S.
134, 139-44 (1985)(holding that an ERISA-covered employee could not recover
compensatory or punitive damages for financial losses which occurred when the
plan mishandled the processing of the employee's claim for disability benefits).
70. Managed Care Organizations will still face exposure to claims from beneficiaries
whose plans are not covered by ERISA. ERISA does not cover government or
church employee benefit plans or plans maintained for the sole purpose of complying with workers' compensation, unemployment compensation, or disability
insurance laws. See 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1994).
71. See Robert J. Conrad Jr. & Patrick D. Seiter, Health Plan Liability in the Age of
Managed Care, 62 DEF. COUNS. J. 191 (1995).
72. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
73. Id. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1994).
74. Id. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1994).
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shall not be deemed an insurance company or insurer for savings
clause purposes.
In light of ERISA's preemption provisions, the United States
Supreme Court established that "the language of ERISA's preemption
clause sweeps broadly, embracing common law causes of action if they
have a connection with or a reference to an ERISA plan."7 5 Laws that
have a "connection with or a reference to such a plan" are deemed to
relate to the plan for ERISA preemption purposes. 7 6 Under this analysis, a state law will be preempted under ERISA even if its effect on
the plan is incidental to the administration of the plan. ERISA's
broad preemption provision has been narrowed by recent cases such
as Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare,Inc. 7 7 In Dukes, the Third Circuit created a new rationale for finding that ERISA does not preempt state
law claims. The court created a distinction between plan created
rights of care and the right to quality care, and found that ERISA
would preempt claims for benefits under the plan, but would not preempt actions that challenge the quality of care. 7 8 The court based its
holding on the fact that ERISA "simply says nothing about the quality
of benefits received."79 Under this new rationale, claims that attack
an MCO for the administration of benefits will be preempted, while
claims that attack the quality of those benefits will not.
The Supreme Court has also indicated there may be limits to ERISA preemption.8 0 In Shaw v. DeltaAir Lines, Inc.,8 1 the Court stated
that state law will not be preempted if "its affect on employee benefit
plans [is] too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner to warrant a
finding that the law 'relates to the plan'."8 2 In New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.,83
the Supreme Court held that state laws aimed at advancing general
state goals, such as assuring the quality of care, may avoid preemption if they do not specifically target or disproportionally burden em84
ployee benefit plans.
The influence of decisions that narrow the scope of ERISA preemption is reflected by the fact many courts refuse to preempt claims
against MCOs for the vicarious liability of their physicians, while con75. Shea v. Esensten 107 F.3d 625, 627 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 297
(1997)(citing Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47-8 (1987)).
76. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-7 (1983).
77. 57 F.3d 350 (3rd Cir. 1995).
78. See id. at 357.
79. Id.
80. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 100 n.21.
83. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
84. See id; see also Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825
(1988).
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tinuing to preempt claims that allege "direct" negligence in the MCO's
administration of benefits.85 Thus, Mrs. Shea's state law action for
wrongful death would not have been preempted had she brought an
action for malpractice against the physician for negligence, contending
Medica was vicariously liable. However, she brought the claim
against Medica only. Therefore, her claim for fraudulent nondisclosure of physician incentives was preempted because the court determined that it "related to" the administration of benefits under the
86
plan.
In Shea, the court relied on the reasoning in Kuhl v. Lincoln National Health Plan,Inc.8 7 for its determination that Mrs. Shea's claim
was preempted under ERISA. In Kuhl, the plaintiffs alleged that a
delay in approval for a surgical procedure resulted in the death of
their family member. The court held that claims of misconduct
against the administrator of an employee health plan for its financial
incentives fit within ERISA's preemption provision. 8S The impact that
85. See Pacificare, Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995). In Pacificare,the
court held that ERISA did not preempt a claim that the HMO was vicariously
liable for alleged medical malpractice of one of its physicians because the claim
did not involve administration or quantity of benefits promised by the plan. However, the court held that the claim which alleged fraudulent administration of an
employee benefit plan was preempted because it clearly related to the administration of the plan. See also Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3rd Cir.
1995)(allowing vicarious liability claims against MCO for medical malpractice to
proceed in state court); Kearney v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 182, 187
(E.D. Pa. 1994)(holding that while ERISA preempts plaintiffs direct negligence
claim against MCO, vicarious liability claim for negligent treatment by plan's
physician was not preempted); Independence HMO, Inc., v. Smith, 733 F. Supp.
983, 988-89 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding that medical malpractice type claims
brought against HMO under the "ostensible agent theory" are not preempted by
ERISA). But see Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482, 1493-94
(7th Cir. 1996) (suggesting in dictum that ERISA's policy of protecting employers'
plans from having to comply with differing state regulations should preclude vicarious liability of all kinds); Corcoran v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321
(5th Cir. 1992)(holding that ERISA preempts actions based on wrongful denial of
benefits even though no adequate remedy could be provided); Ricci v. Gooberman,
840 F. Supp. 316 (D.N.J. 1993) (holding that ERISA preempted patient's state
tort claim that HMO was vicariously liable for alleged medical malpractice of one
of its providers where vicarious liability claim related to the plan); Altieri v.
Cigna Dental Health, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 61, 63-65 (D. Conn. 1990) (holding that
negligent supervision claim against HMO on the theory of vicarious liability was
preempted by ERISA).
86. Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 627-28 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
297 (1997)(citing Anderson v. Humana, Inc., 24 F.3d 889, 891 (7th Cir.
1994)(holding plan participants' attacks on HMO incentive structure were both
preempted and removable)); see also Rodriguez v. Pacificare, Inc., 980 F.2d 1014,
1016-17 (5th Cir. 1993)(holding state law claims based on HMO's refusal to provide referral letter were properly preempted and removed).
87. 999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1993).
88. See id. at 302-03.
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ERISA's preemption structure has on plaintiffs who bring actions
against MCOs is clearly illustrated in the court's holding.89
Following the reasoning of Kuhl, the court in Shea stated:
The outcome of Mrs. Shea's lawsuit would clearly affect how [the defendant's]
ERISA-regulated benefit plan is administered, and if similar cases are
brought in state courts across the country, ERISA plan administrators will
inevitably be forced to tailor their plan disclosures to meet each state's unique
requirements. This result would be at odds with Congress's intent to ensure
90
"the nationally uniform administration of employee benefit plans."

The issue of whether actions against MCOs for fraudulent nondisclosure of their incentive structures are preempted under ERISA was
considered in Lancaster v. Kaiser FoundationHealth Plan, Inc. 9 1 In
Lancaster, the plaintiff brought vicarious liability claims against an
HMO for its physician's negligence, along with claims alleging fraudulent nondisclosure of its physician incentive program. 92 The court
89. Mr. Kuhl was a member of Lincoln National Health Plan, a network model HMO
plan. Under the provisions of the plan, Lincoln National was not required to pay
for services outside of the HMO's service area. Mr. Kuhl was scheduled to undergo surgery which could not be performed in the Kansas City area, because
Kansas City area hospitals did not have the proper equipment. Mr. Kuhl's physicians recommended that the surgery be conducted in St. Louis, which was
outside of the HMO's service area. Prior to the scheduled surgery, Lincoln National contacted Mr. Kuhl and informed him the plan would not pay for the surgery because it would take place outside of the HMO's service benefit area.
Lincoln National then sought the second opinion of a physician who determined
that the surgery was indeed necessary. On July 20, 1989, based on the second
opinion, Lincoln National informed Mr. Kuhl that he would be allowed to proceed
with the surgery in St. Louis. However, due to the delay, the surgery had to be
rescheduled for late September of 1989. Prior to surgery in September, the surgeons determined that surgery was no longer a viable option. Instead, Mr. Kuhl
was placed on a heart transplant waiting list, and died before a donor could be
located. Mr. Kuhl's family brought medical malpractice, tortious interference,
and breach of contract claims against Lincoln National in state court based on
the decision not to pre-certify Mr. Kuhl's surgery. Lincoln National removed the
case to federal court pursuant to ERISA. The federal court granted Lincoln National's motion for summary judgment determining that the plaintiffs' claims
were preempted pursuant to ERISA because the claims "related to" the administration of the health plan. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court
specifically rejected the plaintiffs' argument that Lincoln National assumed the
role of Mr. Kuhl's physician and made negligent decisions concerning his care for
his heart condition by 'canceling" the surgery. Instead, the court held that Lincoln National's decision not to pre-certify payment for the first scheduled surgery
in St. Louis "related" directly to its obligation to administer benefits on behalf of
Mr. Kuhl's employer, and therefore, was preempted by ERISA. Since damages
under ERISA are limited to the recovery of benefits, the enforcement of rights, or
clarification of future benefits under the plan, the plaintiffs were left without a
remedy. See id. at 304-05.
90. Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 627 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 297
(1997)(quoting New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 657 (1995)).
91. 958 F. Supp 1137 (E.D. Va. 1997).
92. See id. at 1140-41.
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found that the vicarious liability claims against the health plan were
not preempted because they did not "sufficiently implicate the underlying objectives of the ERISA statute."9 3 However, the court did find
that the claim against the plan for concealing a system of physician
incentives was preempted because such claims "at their core, assert
that [the plaintiff] was denied benefits by the administrative decision
and
to establish and implement the [physician] [ilncentive [pirogram"
94
therefore, the claims related to the administration of the plan.
Judicial interpretation of ERISA's preemption and civil enforcement provisions has created a hostile environment for plaintiffs who
attempt to sue MCOs for state law actions, such as fraudulent nondisclosure or negligence. These claims will be preempted to the extent
that they "relate to" the administration of the employee benefit plan,
which in turn, leaves the plaintiff without a remedy because compensatory and punitive damages are not available under ERISA's civil enforcement provisions. On the other hand, if a similar plaintiff claims
an HVIO is vicariously liable for the negligence of its physician, the
vicarious liability claim will not be preempted. Such claims may encourage MCOs to reduce malpractice by restructuring their cost-containment mechanisms so they will not encourage physician
malpractice. The more likely result, however, is that MCOs will attempt to minimize their relationship with those who provide care
under their plan in order to reduce their exposure to vicarious liability
claims. Shea did not involve a claim against Medica for vicarious liability, and the court in turn found Mrs. Shea claim preempted by ERISA. Because claims that attack physician incentives inevitably
"relate to" the plan, they are essentially seen by the courts as a denial
of benefits and will likely continue to be preempted.
Even if plaintiffs' claims are not preempted by ERISA,95 claims
against MCOs for the operation of physician incentive plans will still
reface a hostile environment in state court. Courts have generally
96
Typifused to hold MCOs liable for the use of physician incentives.
cally, courts have refused to accept such claims because legislative
policy dictates that they are a legitimate instrument for reducing the
costs of health care. 9 7 The hostile environment has forced plaintiffs
like Mrs. Shea to find new strategies to hold MCOs accountable for the
results of physician incentives.
In Shea, the district court's finding that Mrs. Shea's tort claims
were preempted by ERISA effectively dismissed her state law tort
claims. Under ERISA, Mrs. Shea could not collect any compensatory
93. Id. at 1150.

94. Id.
95. See supra note 70.
96. See supra Part ITl.A.
97. See id.
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or punitive damages for the death of her husband because ERISA's
civil enforcement provisions do not allow such claims. Because preemption left Mrs. Shea without a claim, she was forced to amend her
complaint "to assert Medica's behind-the-scenes efforts to reduce covered referrals violated Medica's fiduciary duties under ERISA."98
C.

Fiduciary Duty to Disclose Physician Incentives Under
ERISA

After the district court found that ERISA preempted Mrs. Shea's
claim for wrongful death, she amended her claim to assert that
Medica's behind-the-scenes financial incentives to reduce referrals to
specialists violated Medica's fiduciary duties under ERISA.99 "Congress intended the definition of 'fiduciary' under ERISA to be broadly
construed."oo Under ERISA, "a person is a fiduciary with respect to a
plan to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan or exercises
any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its
assets,... or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary
responsibility in the administration of such plan."101
This definition of fiduciary implies that "there need not be an express delegation of fiduciary duty in the [health] [pilan instrument itself for persons performing duties of a fiduciary nature to be
considered fiduciaries."102 Therefore, in the context of ERISA, a person is a fiduciary to the extent his/her activities under the plan bring
him/her within the scope of that definition.103 Under this analysis,
Medica was a fiduciary to the extent that it exercised discretionary
control respecting the management of Mr. Shea's health plan.
In Shea, it was not disputed that Medica was a fiduciary with respect to Mr. Shea's health plan. It was disputed, however, whether
Medica had the responsibility as a fiduciary under ERISA to disclose
the financial incentives it used to discourage physicians from referring
98. Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 627 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 297
(1997).
99. See id. The court also determined that Mrs. Shea had standing to pursue an
ERISA remedy. Because Mrs. Shea was not a current beneficiary of the plan (her
husband was dead and she was no longer a beneficiary under the plan), Medica
alleged that she lacked standing to pursue an ERISA remedy. The court held
that "if the fiduciary's alleged ERISA violation caused the former employee to
lose plan participant status, the former employee will nonetheless have standing
to challenge the fiduciary violation.... Any other result would reward Medica for
giving its preferred doctors an incentive to make more money by delivering
cheaper care to the detriment of patients like Mr. Shea.. . ." Id. at 628 (citations
omitted).
100. Donovan v. Mercer, 747 F.2d 304, 308 (5th Cir. 1984).
101. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1994).
102. Concha v. London, 62 F.3d 1493, 1501-02 (9th Cir. 1995).
103. See Maniace v. Commerce Bank, N.A., 40 F.3d 264, 267-68 (8th Cir. 1994).
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patients to specialists.i 0 4 Medica disputed the claim that the duty of
loyalty required an ERISA fiduciary to affirmatively disclose material
facts that could adversely affect a plan member's interests. Fiduciaries under ERISA have a stringent duty of absolute loyalty and a
stringent duty to act in the best interests of plan participants and beneficiaries.1 0 5 The issue of whether this means a fiduciary must "affirmatively" disclose information which might adversely affect a plan
beneficiary's interests, however, was not directly addressed by the
courts prior to Shea.
In its finding that an ERISA fiduciary has an affirmative duty to
disclose material facts, the court in Shea relied on its previous decision in Howe v. Varity Corp.O6 and the Supreme Court's affirmation
of that decision.1 0 7 In Varity, a group of active employees and a group
of retirees sued their employer, Varity Corporation, for the benefits
they would have received had they not been tricked by their employer's plan to rid the company of debt and unwanted employee benefits liabilities.10 The district court found that the employer had
breached its fiduciary duty under ERISA to act solely in the interest of
104. See Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 628 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
297 (1997).
105. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1994). The standard of care for ERISA fiduciaries is
defined as follows:
(1) [A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in
the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and (A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(I) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances
then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar
with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like
character and with like aims ....
Id.
106. 36 F.3d 746 (8th Cir. 1994), affd, 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
107. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
108. In Varity, Varity Corporation and its subsidiary, Massey Ferguson, developed
"Project Sunshine," a plan to rid themselves of debt and employee benefits liability by shifting the liability under its health plan to a new subsidiary, Massey
Combines. To accomplish the shift, Massey transferred 4,000 of the retirees from
the Varity self-insured health plan to the new Massey Combines health plan.
Then, through meetings and written materials, it persuaded 1,500 active employees to accept employment and health plan coverage from Massey Combines.
Throughout 'Project Sunshine," Varity conveyed the message to the active employees that Massey Combines was solid financially, and that their benefits
would be identical to the benefits they had under the Varity plan. In reality,
Massey Combines' odds for success were minimal, and "Project Sunshine" was
nothing more than Varity's attempt to clear its financial statements of health
plan liability and other debts. Despite the assurances that Massey Combines
was financially sound, it was bankrupt from its inception, with a negative net
worth exceeding $46 million. As a result, the company's active employees and
retirees were without benefits which included medical coverage. See id. at 49294.

606
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plan participants and beneficiaries by deliberately deceiving the employees about the security of their benefits.10 9 The district court also
held that the plaintiffs were entitled to equitable relief which included
reinstatement of coverage under the plan and monetary damages. 1 0
In affirming the district court's decision, the Supreme Court specifically rejected Varity's argument that because it complied with ERISA's express disclosure requirements, there was no duty to disclose
any additional information. The Court stated, "If the fiduciary duty
applied to nothing more than activities already controlled by other
specific legal duties, it would serve no purpose."' 1 i
The Court relied on the common law of trusts in finding that Varity
Corporation had a fiduciary duty to disclose under ERISA.12 It noted
that under the common law of trusts, "[1]ying is inconsistent with the
duty of loyalty owed by all fiduciaries."113 However, the Court specifically noted the breach in Varity was an affirmative breach because
Varity Corporation lied to its employees. It stated that because Varity
affirmatively misled the plaintiffs, "we need not reach the question
whether ERISA fiduciaries have any fiduciary duty to disclose truthful
information on their own initiative, or in response to employee
4
inquiries.""i
The decision in Varity strongly indicates that ERISA fiduciaries do
in fact have an affirmative duty to disclose. Under the common law of
trusts, the trustee has a "duty to communicate to the beneficiary material facts affecting the interest of the beneficiary which he knows the
beneficiary does not know and which the beneficiary needs to know for
his protection in dealing with a third person with respect to his interest."1 1 5 As applied to Shea, the fact that a physician has financial
incentives not to refer his/her patient to a specialist would seem to be
6
a material fact affecting a patient."i
The finding in Shea that there is an affirmative duty to disclose
financial incentives to reduce care leaves many open questions about
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

See id. at 494.
See id. at 494-95.
Id. at 504.
See id. at 496 (citing Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Central
Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570 (1985)(noting that Congress invoked the common
law of trusts to define the general scope of a fiduciary's duties under ERISA)).
Id. at 506 (quoting Peoria Union Stock Yards Co. Retirement Plan v. Penn Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 698 F.2d 320, 326 (7th Cir. 1983)).
Id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTs § 173 cmt. d (1959), cited in Shea v. Esensten,
107 F.3d 625, 629 (8th Cir. 1997).
In Shea, the court relied heavily on its own finding in Howe v. Varity Corp., 36
F.3d 746, 754 (8th Cir. 1994), that "the duty of loyalty requires an ERISA fiduciary to communicate any material facts which could adversely affect a plan member's interests." Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 628 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 297 (1997).
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the scope of the fiduciary duty to disclose. It is not clear what other
sorts of omissions could be found to be material facts that the fiduciary
must disclose. For example, does the rule in Shea require an MCO to
disclose the fact that it may pay its primary care physicians less than
other MCOs? An MCO's pay rates could reflect the quality of physicians it employs, and therefore, be material to the beneficiaries who
wish to receive the highest quality of care. The same question arises
with respect to an MCO's procedures for screening its health care
providers, the death rates for surgeries under the plan or under specific surgeons, and even to the rotation schedules of its providers.
One way of limiting the holding in Shea is to look at the specific
problem that the court was addressing. In its holding, the court
stated, "From the patient's point of view, a financial incentive scheme
put in place to influence a treating doctor's referral practices when the
patient needs specialized care is certainly a material piece of information. This kind of patient necessarily relies on the doctor's advice
about treatment options, and the patient must know whether the advice is influenced by selfserving financial considerations created by
the health insurance provider." 1' 7 This language indicates the court
was specifically addressing the hidden nature of financial incentives
and the fact that financial incentives to reduce care are not normally
present in the provider/patient relationship.
Given the unique nature of the problem that the court was addressing, the holding in Shea could be limited to the disclosure of
"unique" facts which are present in the context of managed care. Differing levels of skill and experience, death rates for surgery, and rotation schedules for physicians are all normally present in the provider/
patient relationship outside of the context of managed care, and therefore, would probably not have to be disclosed under the rule formulated in Shea. The disclosure of financial incentives levels the playing
field, and moves patients closer to the position that they would be in if
they were not receiving care from an MCO.118
Although the court in Shea found an affirmative duty to disclose
financial incentives under ERISA, a district court recently reached the
opposite conclusion in Weiss v. CIGNA Healthcare,Inc.119 In Weiss,
117. Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 628 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 297
(1997).
118. That is not to say that the rule makes managed care entirely similar to traditional fee-for-service arrangement. Patients under managed care will still be
subject to other cost-containment measures such as utilization review, limited
access to certain medications, and reduced hospital stays. However, these costcontainment measures differ significantly from "direct" financial incentives to reduce care because such procedures are disclosed in plan documents or are highly
visible to patients, while financial incentives are not. See McGraw, supranote 5.
119. 972 F. Supp. 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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the plaintiffsi 20 alleged that the defendant violated ERISA by failing
to disclose the nature of its financial arrangements with the physicians under the plan and sought declaratory and injunctive relief to
disclose the terms of the arrangements. Unlike the holding in Shea,
the court in Weiss refused to extend the fiduciary under ERISA to incude the affirmative duty to disclose material information. The court
noted the Supreme Court's holding in Varity was limited to circumstances where the "fiduciary did not merely fail to disclose information, but in fact provided incorrect or misleading information."' 2 i The
court relied on the fact that no specific injury was alleged, because the
contentions "that physicians will compromise their ethical responsibilities in response to financial incentives-while possibly a valid legislative concern-is too speculative to support a legal claim pursuant to
ERISA."122

The Weiss court's conclusion that an MCO's use of physician incentives is a legislative, not a judicial issue, is supported by the fact that
courts have been unwilling, even outside the context of ERISA, to consider actions against an MCO's use of physician incentives.' 23 Holding that an MCO must disclose its physician incentives, however, is
distinguishable from actions which could force an MCO to discontinue
the use of incentives. Disclosure does not force an MCO to discontinue
or change its physician incentive structure; it merely requires the
MCO to inform its customers that such incentives are in place. By
holding that such incentives must be disclosed, Shea did not contradict the legislative intent to allow such incentives which control the
cost of health care. Rather, the court was addressing the fact that
patients in managed care are unaware that such incentives are used,
and therefore, are unable to make a fully informed decision about
whether they can trust their physician's judgment, and if it is necessary, seek a second opinion.' 24 In this context, holding that an MCO
must disclose its physician incentive structure arguably does not
120. The plaintiffs in Weiss were participants in an employee welfare benefit plan, and
the defendant, CIGNA Healthcare of New York, was an HMO retained by the
plaintiffs employer to provide health care under the plan. See id. at 748.
121. Id. at 754.
122. Id. at 755. Indeed, the court went as far as to state that "Weiss' contention that
CIGNA's compensation package facially violates ERISA simply because it deprives her of her right to receive 'medical opinions and referrals unsullied by
mixed motives' is tantamount to a claim that risk-sharing arrangements in managed care are inherently illegal, a position that is refuted by federal and New
York Law." Id. at 753 (citation omitted). The court also noted that "[tlo the extent
that the result here is inconsistent with the decision[ ] of the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Shea v. Esensten,... this Court respectfully declines to follow [that] decision[ I." Id. at 755 n.6 (citation omitted).
123. See supra Part III.A.
124. See Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 629 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
297 (1997).
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lessen the legislature's goal to contain health care costs through the
use of such incentives.
Shea did not address the fact that physicians are also likely to be
obligated to disclose the use of financial incentives under the doctrine
of informed consent. In Moore v. Regentsi 2 5 the California Supreme
Court held that a physician is required to disclose the presence of a
financial conflict of interest. In Moore, the plaintiff sued his physician
who used his spleen cells to create a financially lucrative line of cells.
The plaintiff alleged the physician failed to disclose his preexisting
economic interest in the plaintiffs cells before he obtained consent for
the medical procedure that removed the cells.1 26 The court held that
under the doctrine of informed consent, the duty to disclose included
personal economic interests that were unrelated to the patient's
health because such interests "may affect the physician's professional
judgment."1 27 While the decision did not directly address the financial arrangements used in managed care, the court's holding arguably
suggests that under the doctrine of informed consent, financial incentives to reduce care could be considered interests that may affect a
physician's medical judgment, and therefore, must be disclosed.
Despite the holding in Moore, it does not appear that physicians
are willing to disclose financial incentives which reduce care. A recent
report of the Council of Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American
Medical Association (AMA) stated that such "incentives are not inherently unethical, but they can be depending on their design and intensity."i

28

Instead of advocating disclosure of such incentives as part of

the doctrine of informed consent, the AMA recommends that incentives to reduce care should be disclosed by the plan administrator on
29
enrollment and annually thereafter.1
However, by requiring disclosure of the plan, the AMA is ignoring
the same problems which the court in Shea failed to address: whether
MCOs could disclose the language in a way that is unclear to the consumer.1 30 Many of the same problems surrounding the use of standard form contracts would exist because most consumers are unable to
accurately assess the impact that financial incentives would have on
their care. Even if the disclosure language is clear, most enrollees
have little choice over what plan they select because it is part of their
employee benefits package. Even if consumers do have a choice, they
are unlikely to read the plan literature at all.1 3 1 Most importantly,
125.
126.
127.
128.

793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
See id. at 482-83.
Id. at 483.
Council Report: Ethical Issues in Managed Care, 273 JAMA 330, 333
(1995)[hereinafter Council Report].
129. See id. at 335.
130. See McGraw, supra note 5, at 1839.
131. See id.
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both the AMA and the court's holding in Shea ignore the fact that despite disclosure by the plan administrator, the fundamental conflict
created by financial incentives will still exist. The physician will still
be put in the precarious position of having to choose between the medical well-being of his/her patient and his/her own financial well-being.
In addition, plaintiffs who bring actions for failure to disclose financial incentives still face the difficult task of establishing that his/
her harm was a result of the failure to disclose such arrangements.
Plaintiffs have to establish that they would have taken affirmative
steps to find other care. Due to the inherent power differential in the
physician-patient relationship, most patients are unlikely to question
their physician's judgment even in the face of a disclosure that their
physician's income is dependent on reducing the cost of care which
they administer.132 Because most medical malpractice actions do not
result in verdicts for plaintiffs, disclosure by physicians seems to be an
unlikely solution to the problems presented by managed care. 13 3
D.

Remedy for Breach of Fiduciary Duty to Disclose Under
ERISA

Shea addressed the fact that patients in MCOs are unaware of
physician incentives without disturbing the legislative intent of allowing such incentives to reduce costs. However, the court failed to
address that under ERISA, Mrs. Shea probably does not have an adequate remedy for the death of her husband.134 Under ERISA section
409 (a)135 and 502 (a)136 remedies are expressly limited to equitable
damages.
Prior to the Varity opinion, it appeared an individual could not sue
for breach of fiduciary duty and obtain any appropriate relief under
ERISA. In MassachusettsMutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell, 137 the
Supreme Court held that ERISA section 409138 only authorized relief
for the plan as a whole. Therefore, individuals suing an ERISA plan
administrator for breach of fiduciary duty apparently could not seek
"appropriate equitable relief' for themselves, and could only recover
132. See id. at 1844.
133. See Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 297
(1997).
134. The court specifically declined to consider any remedy related issues. See id. at
629.
135. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 409, 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a)
(1994).
136. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)
(1994).
137. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
138. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1994).
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for the plan as a whole.13 9 The holding in Russell led a number of
courts to conclude an individual could not recover individual relief for
breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA.140 In addition, in Mertens v.
HewittAssociatesi41 the Supreme Court held that the "appropriate equitable relief' available under section 502 (a)(3) of ERISA142 included
only traditional equitable relief, such as injunctive relief and restitution, and did not include traditional "legal damages" that would allow
3
compensatory or even punitive damages.14
In Varity Corp. v. Howe,1 44 the Supreme Court reversed its tendency to interpret ERISA as providing only limited remedies. For the
first time, the Court recognized that a plan participant may recover
individual relief for a breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA.i45 In
Varity, this relief came in the form of reinstating employees to a plan
that "but for" the employer's breach of fiduciary duty, the employees
would have never left. In Varity, the Court assumed that this was
"appropriate equitable relief."146 The Court noted, however, that
"characterizing a denial of benefits as a breach of fiduciary duty does
not necessarily change the standard a court should apply when reviewing the administrator's decision to deny benefits."1 47 Therefore,
courts are likely to continue to limit the type of damages under ERISA
to equitable damages only.
In light of the decision in Varity, a plaintiffs ability to recover
against an MCO for a breach of fiduciary duty depends on whether
such damages can be properly characterized as "appropriate equitable
139. ERISA section 409 on its face does not allow recovery for breach of fiduciary duty.
See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1994). Section 502 allows the plan other appropriate
equitable relief for breach of fiduciary duty, but does not on its face appear to
allow appropriate equitable relief for individuals. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1994).
140. See Horan v. Kaiser Steel Retirement Plan, 947 F.2d 1412 (9th Cir. 1991); Simmons v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 940 F.2d 614 (11th Cir. 1991). But see
Bixler v. Central Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292 (3d Cir.
1993); Anweiler v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 3 F.3d 986 (7th Cir. 1993).
141. 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
142. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1994).
148. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248 (1993); see also Buckley Dement, Inc.
v. Travelers Plan Adm'rs, 39 F.3d 784 (7th Cir. 1994)(no recovery for medical
expenses that would have been recovered if plan administrator had not failed to
process plaintiff's claim within the time period covered by the plan).
144. 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
145. The Court found that the language of section 502 (a)(3) is "broad enough to cover
individual relief for breach of a fiduciary obligation." Id. at 510. Therefore, section 409 which only allows relief for the plan as a whole, is not the exclusive
means of remedying a breach of fiduciary duty. Section 502(a)(3) acts as a "catchall" provision allowing appropriate equitable relief for injuries caused by violations of ERISA which might not otherwise be available. See id. at 512.
146. Id. at 515.
147. Id. at 514.
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relief." If a plaintiff seeks damages that can be characterized as compensatory or punitive, they will be afforded no relief under ERISA.148
In Macleod v. Oregon Lithoprint, Inc.,' 4 9 the court determined
compensatory damages were not appropriate equitable relief under
ERISA. In Macleod, the plaintiff alleged the defendant breached his
fiduciary duty under ERISA by failing to inform her in a timely manner that she had become eligible for coverage under a cancer insurance policy. The plaintiff sought a judgment for the amount of
benefits she would have received had she elected coverage under the
cancer policy. The court noted the plaintiffs claim "is in essence a
negligence claim, for which she seeks to be made whole through an
award of money damages equal in amount to the benefits that she
would have been paid and compensation for her emotional distress"
and the scope of relief available under ERISA is limited to equitable
damages.15o The court distinguished its holding from the Supreme
Court's holding in Varity by noting that the plaintiffs in Varity were
seeking reinstatement into a plan not compensatory relief.151
As applied to the facts in Shea, it does not appear that any damages for the wrongful death of Mrs. Shea's husband could be properly
characterized as "appropriate equitable relief' under ERISA. She
could not reinstate her husband to the plan because he was already
dead. Any monetary recovery that she could receive for Medica's
breach of fiduciary duty to disclose its financial incentives can only be
characterized as compensatory relief for the death of her husband. An
action for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA will afford Mrs. Shea
no appropriate relief for the death of her husband. Therefore, even if
she could show that Medica breached its fiduciary duty to disclose,
Mrs. Shea's claim would ultimately be dismissed because she has no
appropriate remedy under ERISA.
Because it does not appear that compensation for the death of Mrs.
Shea's husband can be characterized as "equitable" relief, MCOs will
continue to be insulated from individual claims for compensatory and
punitive damages in all cases where such claims are preempted by
ERISA.152 However, the rule in Shea that MCOs have a fiduciary
duty under ERISA to disclose their financial incentives is likely to be
effective in cases where the plaintiffs seek only equitable relief. The
rule in Shea allows beneficiaries of ERISA-qualified health plans to
seek declaratory actions to force their health care providers to disclose
their incentive structure to the beneficiaries under the plan.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

See supra Part III.B.
102 F.3d 376 (9th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 378.
See id. at 379.
See supra Part III.B.
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In Drolet v. Healthsource, Inc.,153 a group of health plan beneficiaries brought a class action suit against the HIO alleging that various undisclosed financial incentives the HMO provided to its
physicians breached the HMO's fiduciary duties under ERISA. In denying the HMO's motion to dismiss, the court stated that "Drolet's
breach of fiduciary duty claims plainly involve the deprivation of her
legally protected interest in receiving accurate information from the
plan's fiduciaries."' 5 4 The holding in Drolet represents the type of situation in which the holding in Shea will be most applicable.
Even though the court in Shea failed to address the remedy issues,
the holding addressed the most significant problems involving an
MCO's use of financial incentives to reduce care, which is the fact that
patients are unaware of such incentives.1 55 The holding in Shea indicates there is a growing judicial concern that such incentives,
although approved by Congress,156 must be disclosed to beneficiaries.
As the Shea court stated, patients have a right to know whether the
care they are receiving is "influenced by self-serving financial considerations created by the health insurance provider" in order to make a
fully informed decision whether to trust their physicians' treatment
57
recommendations.1
Because Mrs. Shea does not have a remedy for her husband's death
under ERISA, the court's holding in Shea is in essence a policy decision by the court. In holding that there is a fiduciary duty to disclose
the use of financial incentives, the court has dictated that while such
incentives are inherently legal, they nonetheless must be disclosed to
beneficiaries under ERISA-qualified plans. As applied to plans which
are not ERISA qualified, the holding in Shea, if followed, dictates that
the use of financial incentives in such plans must also be disclosed.
Because the fiduciary duty recognized in Shea has its foundations in
the common law of trusts, the decision should be equally applicable to
similar claims, whether or not such claims are preempted. The only
difference is that in the cases which are not preempted, plaintiffs like
Mrs. Shea will not be precluded from collecting compensatory or punitive damages for their claims for breach of fiduciary duty.'SS
Yet, requiring MCOs to disclose their use of financial incentives
will have a minimal effect on the most significant problem surrounding their use. Disclosure does nothing to prevent physicians from considering their own financial interests when treating their patients.
153. 968 F. Supp. 757 (D.N.H. 1997).
154. Id. at 759-60.
155. See Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 628-29 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
297 (1997).
156. See supra Part HI.B.
157. Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 628-29 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.

297 (1997).
158. See supra Part II1.D.

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:588

Rather, it puts the burden on the consumer to make a decision about
whether or not such financial incentives are hindering the quality of
care that he/she is receiving from his/her own physician. Health care
consumers are usually involuntary consumers who cannot plan their
purchases or assess alternatives carefully. 15 9 Even if consumers are
aware that a plan uses financial incentives which reduce care, they
may not be able to properly assess the effect a plan is likely to have on
the quality of care they receive. 160 Most health care consumer knowledge is dependent upon the consumer's relationship with his/her own
physician.161 In addition, even if a consumer of health care is informed that his/her physician's financial interests are potentially in
conflict with his/her medical decisions, the cost of finding a second
opinion may be too great because the money is likely to come out of the
162
consumer's own pocket.
The only way to eliminate the conflict of interest problems which
are created by the use of financial incentives is to ban their use or to
reduce their strength. 16 3 Congress has already restricted the use of
such incentives in Medicare risk-contract programs, by not allowing
specific incentive payments to individual physicians to reduce care to
specific patients. 16 4 Such regulations are in direct response to studies
finding that pressures on physicians to reduce care was greatest when
the incentives are based on the performance of an individual physician
rather than a group of physicians. 16 5 However, the regulations affecting non-Medicare risk contract programs are not nearly as effective. 16 6 These regulations restrict direct incentives to reduce care and
limit physicians' salary bonus/withhold payments to 25% of a physician's income, but do not apply to MCOs with more than 25,000 enrollees. 16 7 Congress could strengthen these regulations by further
limiting incentive payments as a percentage of physician income and
by making all MCOs subject to such regulations, regardless of their
enrollment numbers. Furthermore, Congress could require that financial incentives must be calculated according to the performance of
a sizable group of physicians, rather than to individual physicians.
Congress could also require that financial incentives be based on qual159. See MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY, AND MORALS: PHYSICIANS' CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST 216 (1993).

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 216-17.
id. at 217.
id. at 231-33.
id.
McGraw, supra note 5, at 1833.
id. at 1835 (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HRD-89-29, MEDI-

CARE: PHYSICIAN INCENTIVE PAYMENTS BY PREPAID HEALTH PLANS COULD LOWER
QUALITY OF CARE (1988)).

166. See 42 C.F.R. § 417.479 (1997).
167. See id.
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ity, rather than quantity, of care.t68 Such regulations would address
the most important issue surrounding the use of financial incentives
by reducing the chance that physicians will take their financial wellbeing into account over their patients' medical well-being.
In light of the problems surrounding the disclosure of financial incentives, it appears that the court's holding in Shea does little to address the most significant problem that financial incentives create.
The holding in Shea does not decrease the likelihood that a physician
will take into account his/her own economic interests in making medical decisions. Shea merely holds that patients should be warned that
the plan uses such incentives. Given the inherent difficulties that consumers in the health care context have in assessing the effect that
financial incentives will have on the quality of care, requiring disclosure does little to address the problems that financial incentives introduce into the provider-patient relationship.
IV. CONCLUSION
The holding in Shea represents the limitations of addressing concerns surrounding the use of financial incentives to reduce the costs of
health care through the judiciary. The fact that Congress has expressly allowed the use of financial incentives to control the costs of
care means that clainis attacking their use generally will not be successful. In addition, ERISA preemption creates a mechanism which
insulates MCOs from compensatory and punitive damages that would
otherwise be available to plaintiffs. The court in Shea went out of its
way to hold that there is a fiduciary duty under ERISA to disclose the
use of financial incentives by first expanding the existing law to find
there is an affirmative duty to disclose such incentives and then by
finding that Mrs. Shea had a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, despite the fact that such a claim probably will not afford her any remedy for the death of her husband.
Despite the fact that the court went out of its way to create a policy
of financial incentives disclosure, such a policy will have a limited effect on the most significant problem surrounding financial incentive
use. Even if such incentives are disclosed, the conflict between a physician's financial well-being and his/her patients' well-being will still
exist. In addition, this problem is magnified by the fact that health
care consumers are typically dependent on their physician as their
main source of information in making decisions about the quality of
their care. Therefore, the court's holding in Shea represents only a
limited solution to the problems which are created by the use of financial incentives. Only health care consumers who are capable of prop168. See Council Report, supra note 128, at 335.
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erly evaluating the significance of the disclosure of financial incentives
will benefit.
The hurdles facing plaintiffs who attack financial incentives were
created by the legislature. Legislative policy ensures that the use of
financial incentives to lower the costs of care will not be attacked by
the courts, and ensures that plaintiffs who sue ERISA-qualified plans
will only be able to receive equitable damages. Because Shea represents the judicial limits of addressing the problems surrounding the
use of financial incentives, these problems can only be further resolved
through fundamental changes in legislative policy.
Paul Heimann '99

